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1 Introduction
The problem of environmental pollution is caused by the fact that some
activities which are as such beneficial, such as the production of phar-
maceuticals, can cause negative side effects for third parties, the tra-
ditional externalities. Precisely because pollution is an externality, the
starting point of the economic analysis of environmental pollution is
that a decision maker, such as the pharmaceutical company of our
example, will not take into account the externality when it takes deci-
sions on e.g. the production level and the investments in measures to
avoid pollution, such as the instalment of a water treatment plant. En-
vironmental pollution is considered by many scholars to be the example
of an externality (see generally Van den Bergh, 1988, 234).
In the absence of the law there will – in principle - be no incentive
for the polluting factory to take in account the pollution it is causing.
In other words : in the absence of legal rule the externality will not be
internalised. This immediately indicates in a very simple way the eco-
nomic goal of environmental law : it should lead to an internalisation
of the externality by forcing the potential polluter to take into account
the pollution it is causing in its decision making process (Faure, 1996).
If the law can reach this, the pollution would no longer be external to
the activity, but would be internalised e.g. because the potential pol-
luter decides as a consequence of the pollution to invest in abatement
techniques. The body of environmental law subsequently deals with
the question how environmental law can give incentives to internalise
the externality the pollution is causing. A variety of legal instruments
can lead to such an internalisation. Economists would traditionally
advance the use of taxes to reach this goal, although increasingly at-
tention is paid to market based instruments, such as emissions trading
and marketable pollution rights.
In this paper I will try to show how a variety of traditional legal
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instruments can be used to remedy environmental pollution. First the
crucial question will be addressed whether liability can be consi-dered
as an instrument to prevent environmental pollution. This is an impor-
tant question, since many studies on environmental economics seem
to neglect the importance of environmental liability. Liability rules are
considered by some also as a market solution and therefore certainly
merit attention. However, the traditional public interest criteria for re-
gulation can be used to explain why liability rules alone can not suffice
to control the risks posed by environmental harm (2). However, the con-
clusion that in environmental law some regulatory invention (through
licences and emission standards) will be necessary does not exclude
the role of environmental liability. Hence the question arises how liabi-
lity rules and regulation can be used jointly to remedy environmental
pollution and how they mutually influence each other (3). Finally, the
question will have to be asked which of these liability rules is optimal
to internalize environmental risks (4) and a few concluding remarks
will be formulated.
Thus this paper on the one hand attempts to show, without fancy
economic modelling, how traditional economic analyses (theory of re-
gulation, liability rules) can be used to analyse environmental law. This
may provide useful insights to lawyers wondering about the potential
use and applications of “law and economics” to environmental law. The
concrete application of well known theories to the specific field of envi-
ronmental law has the advantage that it immediately shows the useful-
ness of economic theory for legal doctrine and policy. At the same time,
a reminder of the classic theories of law and economics may be useful
for environmental economists as well who on the one hand some times
tend to be overenthousiastic of market based instruments, forgetting
some benefits of regulation (mainly information advantages) and so-
metimes neglecting that liability rules can be considered as a market
solution as well.
Turning back to the crucial question of this paper, how the law can
contribute to an internalisation of environmental harm, the first crucial
question is obviously whether environmental risks should primarily be
internalized via regulation or liability rules.
2 Environmental regulation
2.1 Variety of legal instruments
Assuming that, as will be the case in many pollution cases, Coasean
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bargaining is not possible because of prohibitive transaction costs1, the
question arises what kind of policy instruments should be used to give
incentives to a potential polluter to prevent environmental harm. Tra-
ditionally there were three possible instruments which were addressed.
First of all it is possible to tax the pollution and thus to use a system of
levies or charges, which will give the potential polluter an incentive to
reduce environmental harm. Second, it is possible to use the liability
system, assuming that the potential polluter will be deterred by the fo-
resight of having to pay compensation to a victim for the environmental
harm he caused. Third, it is possible to fix pollution standards (nota-
bly emmission standards) ex ante in regulation and more specifically
in environmental licenses. Now, in addition to these, a whole new set
of policy instruments has been developed. Economists increasingly ad-
vocate the use of market oriented policy instruments, such as systems
of emmission trading and marketable permits. In addition attention
is given to voluntary compliance mechanisms, such as environmental
agreements.
It is obviously not possible to discuss this whole set of possible
environmental policy instruments within the scope of this paper2. I will
focus on two traditional instruments, being on the one hand liability
rules and on the other hand safety regulation.
2.2 Criteria for safety regulation
Let us examine under what kind of circumstances liability rules may
not suffice to deter environmental harm and a regulatory intervention
may be necessary. The choice between regulation and liability rules
has been thoroughly examined by Steven Shavell in 1984, in a paper
in which he advances several criteria that influence the choice between
safety regulation and liability rules (see Shavell, 1984 and 1987).
2.2.1 Information asymmetry as a criterion for regulatory
intervention
Information deficiencies have often been advanced as a cause of market
failure and as the justification for government intervention through re-
gulation (see Stigler, 1961; Schwartz and Wilde, 1979; Mackaay, 1982).
Also, for the proper operation of a liability system, information on e.g.
the existing legal rules, the accident risk, and efficient measures to
prevent accidents, is a precondition for an efficient deterrence. Accor-
ding to Shavell, the parties in an accident setting generally have much
better information on the accident risk than that possessed by the re-
gulatory body (see Shavell, 1984, 359). The parties themselves have, in
1 We assume here indeed positive transactions costs so that this internalisation can not auto-
matically be reached via the Coase Theorem (see Coase, 1960).
2 An excellent overview of these instruments is presented by Gunningham and Grabosky, 1998.
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principle, the best information on the costs and benefits of the activity
that they undertake and of the optimal way to prevent accidents. This
”assumption of information” will, however, be reversed if it becomes
clear that some risks are not readily appreciated by the parties in an
accident setting. Therefore, for every activity the question that will have
to be asked is whether either the government or the parties involved
can acquire the information at the least cost.
2.2.2 Insolvency risk
If the potential damages can be so high that they will exceed the wealth
of the individual injurer, liability rules will not provide optimal incen-
tives. The reason is that the costs of care are directly related to the
magnitude of the expected damages. If the expected damages are much
greater than the individual wealth of the injurer, the injurer will only
consider the accident as having a magnitude equal to his wealth. He
will take, therefore, only the care necessary to avoid an accident equal
to his wealth, which can be lower than the care required to avoid the
total accident risk (see Shavell, 1984, 360). This is a simple application
of the principle that the deterrent effect of tort liability only works if the
injurer has assets to pay for the damages he causes. If an injurer is
protected against such liability, a problem of underdeterrence arises3
(see Shavell, 1986).
Safety regulation can overcome this problem of underdeterrence
caused by insolvency. 4In that case the efficient care will be determined
ex ante by regulation and will be effected by enforcement instruments
which induce the potential injurer to comply with the regulatory stan-
dard, irrespective of his wealth.
In that case a problem might still arise if the regulation were also
enforced by means of monetary sanctions. Again, if these were to exceed
the injurer’s wealth, the insolvency problem would remain. Hence, if a
safety regulation is introduced because of a potential insolvency pro-
blem, the regulation itself should be enforced by non-monetary sanc-
tions (see Shavell, 1985).
2.2.3 The threat of a liability suit
Some activities can cause considerable damage, but even so a law suit
to recover these damages may be never brought. If this were the case,
there would of course be no deterrent effect of liability rules. Therefore,
the absence of a liability suit would again be an argument to enforce
the duty of efficient care by means of safety regulations rather than
through liability rules (see Shavell, 1984, 363). There can be a number
3 Below we will show that insolvency causes especially a problem under a strict liability rule,
but less so under negligence.
4 If insurance would come into the picture it could overcome the problems of underdeterrence,
provided that the moral hazard problem, caused by insurance, can be cured.
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of reasons why a law suit is not brought, even though considerable
damages have been caused.
Sometimes an injurer can escape liability because the harm is
thinly spread among a number of victims. As a consequence, the da-
mage incurred by every individual victim is so small that he has no
incentive to bring a suit. In particular, this problem will arise if the
damage is not caused to an individual but to a common property, such
as e.g. the surface waters in which each member of the population has
a minor interest. In addition, a long time might have elapsed before
the damage becomes apparent; in this case much of the necessary evi-
dence may be either lost or not obtained. Another problem is that if the
damage only manifests itself years after the activity, the injurer might
have gone out of business.
A related problem is that it is often hard to prove that a causal link
exists between an activity and a type of damage (see Landes and Pos-
ner, 1984, 417). The burden of proof of a causal relationship becomes
more difficult with the increasing passage of time since the damaging
incident took place. Often a victim will not recognise that the harm had
been caused by a tort, but might think that his particular ailment, e.g.
cancer, had a ”natural cause”, associated with a general ill health . For
all these reasons a liability suit might not be brought and hence sa-
fety regulation is necessary to ensure that the potential polluter takes
efficient care5.
2.2.4 Administrative costs
When examining the pro and contra’s of liability versus regulation, the
administrative costs of both systems should also be compared. Lia-
bility rules are clearly costly in terms of time for both parties and in
court fees. A part of these costs is borne by the whole community, such
as e.g. the cost of the legal system, fees for the judges etc. Regulation
produces costs for the community, including the costs of making the
regulation, setting the standards, passing the statutes etc. and of sub-
sequent enforcement (see Shavell, 1984, 363-364).
In this respect the liability system seems to have an advantage :
the administrative costs of the court system are only incurred if an
accident has actually happened. The main advantage of the tort system
is that a lot of accidents will be prevented by the deterrent effect of being
held liable and having to pay damages to the victim. In case of safety
regulation the costs of passing the regulation and of enforcing it are
always there, whether there are accidents or not.
5 For alternatives to liability suits see Bocken, 1987, 83-87; 1988, 3-10.
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2.3 The need to regulate environmental pollution
After having discussed these criteria for regulation6 I will now discuss
the question of how these criteria relate to environmental pollution. If
one takes the criteria for safety regulation discussed above and applies
them to the potential risk caused by environmental pollution, there is
no doubt that liability rules alone are not sufficient.
If one looks at the first criterion, that of information costs, it must
be stressed that an assessment of the risks of a certain activity often
requires expert knowledge and judgement. Small organisations might
lack the incentive or resources to invest in research to find out what
the optimal care level would be. Also, there would be little incentive
to carry out intensive research if the results were automatically avai-
lable to competitors in the market : this is the well-known “free rider”
problem. This problem can partially be countered by legal instruments
granting an intellectual property to the results of the research. Howe-
ver, the problem remains that it may not be possible for small com-
panies to undertake studies on the optimal technology for preventing
environmental damage. Therefore, it is often more efficient to allow the
government itself to do the research on the optimal technology (e.g. in a
governmental environmental research institute). The results of this re-
search can then be passed on to the parties in the market through the
regulation. Hence, the setting of environmental standards in regulation
can be seen as a means of passing on information on the minimal en-
vironmental technology required. Obviously, it is more efficient for the
government to acquire information on the optimal emission standard
than it would be for e.g. an individual firm to find out what additional
reduction in pollution would produce an optimal reduction of the ex-
pected damages from the emission. There are undeniable “economies
of scale” advantages in regulation.
Also, the insolvency argument points in the direction of regula-
tion. Pollution can be caused by individuals or firms with assets which
are generally lower than the damages they can cause by the pollution.
In this respect it should not be forgotten that even a small firm can
cause harm to a large number of individuals or to entire ecosystems.
The amount of damages caused by this emission can of course largely
exceed his individual assets. Moreover, most firms have been incor-
porated as a legal entity and therefore benefit from limited liability.
Hence, the individual shareholders are not liable to the extent of their
personal assets, but a creditor of the firm can only lay claim to part on
all of the total assets purchased in the firm by the shareholders.
Also the chances of a liability suit being brought for damage cau-
sed by wrongful pollution is naturally very low. The damage is often
spread over a large number of people, who will have difficulties to orga-
nise themselves to bring a law suit. In addition, the damage could only
6 These are often referred to as “public interest” criteria for regulation to contrast them with
“private interest” explanations for regulation, as advanced by public choice scholars.
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become apparent some years after the emission took place. This will
bring proof of causation and latency problems, which will only make it
difficult for a lawsuit to be brought against the polluter.
For these reasons it is clear that some form of government re-
gulation of environmental pollution is necessary. To reformulate : this
shows that liability rules alone can not suffice to prevent environmen-
tal harm, but there might be other, publicly imposed, instruments than
the command and control type regulation which can be used to reach
this goal. Taxes are obviously such an alternative. But also these are
publicly imposed and can hence be considered as ’regulation’ Another
question, which will be discussed below, is whether this necessarily
implies that environmental law should solely depend upon regulation
or whether regulation can still fulfill a supplementary role.
2.4 Safety regulation in practice
When Shavell’s criteria for safety regulation are applied to the envi-
ronmental risk, one can easily note that a strong argument can be
made that the efficient care to be taken to avoid environmental damage
should also be fixed ex ante by regulation.
In many cases this regulation consists of licences or permits in
which an administrative authority fixes an emission standard which
must be followed by the potential polluter. These licences play a cru-
cial role in environmental policy in most countries. An improvement of
environmental quality will mostly be effected by imposing more strin-
gent emission standards in administrative licences. Hence, the general
requirement that emissions are controlled through licences and that
the quality and quantity of the emissions are regulated by the con-
ditions in this licence, is a cornerstone of environmental law. Since
these licences are administrative acts, in most legal systems environ-
mental law is considered to be a part of administrative law. Criminal
law usually only comes into the picture to sanction a violation of ad-
ministrative regulations or emission standards in the licences.
Although environmental pollution is in the first place controlled
through these administrative licences, in individual cases there can
still be damage to the environment. Then again liability under tort law
comes into the picture and the question is raised of the influence of
regulation on the liability system and vice versa7. These complimenta-
rities between tort law and regulation shall be discussed below.
Although it is difficult to examine whether the environmental re-
gulation is generally also effective in reducing environmental harm,
some studies have attempted to examine the effectiveness of safety
regulation in controlling environmental harm. These studies do not
7 Complementarities between tort law and regulation have been addressed by Rose-Ackerman,
1991, 1992a and 1992b.
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address the specific quality of every environmental law, but examine
whether regulation has generally been more important in reducing en-
vironmental harm than liability rules. Dewees demonstrated that in
North-America the quality of the environment has improved substan-
tially as a result of regulatory efforts, not so much in response to legal
action in tort (see Dewees, 1992).
This empirical evidence of the success of regulation, compared to
tort law, has been stressed in the recent book of Dewees/Duff/Trebil-
cock (see Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock, 1996). They hold that the large
regulatory effort to improve the environment has met with considera-
ble success when measured by the reduction of emissions, but that
it is more difficult to argue that the environmental regulations of the
1970’s in U.S. equally had a considerable influence on the ambient
environmental quality. Moreover, they also stress that while environ-
mental regulation is a determining factor in pollutant emissions and
ambient concentrations, other non-regulatory factors such as econo-
mic growth and even the weather also influence environmental quality
(see Dewees, Duff and Trebilcock, 1996).
3 Liability and regulation combined
3.1 Necessity of the combination
I just stressed that according to Shavell’s criteria there is a strong ar-
gument to control the environmental risk through ex ante regulation
(or taxes). However, in individual cases there can still be damage to
the environment. Then again liability under tort comes into the pic-
ture and the question has been addressed in the literature how regula-
tion influences the liability system and vice versa. These complemen-
tarities between tort law and regulation have more particularly been
addressed by Rose-Ackerman (see Rose-Ackerman, 1992b and 1996),
Faure/Ruegg (see Faure and Ruegg, 1994) and Kolstad/Ulen/Johnson
(see Kolstad, Ulen and Johnson, 1990). Rose-Ackerman also compared
US and European experiences in using regulation versus tort law in
environmental policy (see Rose-Ackerman, 1992a and 1995). The first
point which is often stressed, is that the fact that there are many argu-
ments in favour of ex ante regulation of the environment, does not mean
that the tort system should not be used any longer for its deterring and
compensating functions. One reason to still rely on the tort system is
that the effectiveness of (environmental) regulation is dependent upon
enforcement, which may be weak. In addition the influence of lobby
groups on regulation, to which public choice theory has rightly poin-
ted, can to some extent be overcome by combining safety regulation and
liability rules. Moreover, safety regulation, e.g. emission standards in
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licences, can be outdated fast and often lacks flexibility, which equally
merits a combination with tort rules.
Hence, from the above it follows that although there is a strong
case for safety regulation to control the environmental risk, tort rules
will still play an important role as well. Hence, the question arises what
the influence is of regulation on the liability system and vice versa. How
do these two systems mutually influence each other ?
3.2 Violation of regulation and liability
The first question to be answered in that respect is whether a violation
of a regulatory standard should automatically be considered a fault
under tort law and thus lead to liability of the licensee.
Assuming that the licence sets the regulatory standard at the ef-
ficient care level a violation of the regulatory standard should indeed
lead to liability to give the licensee an incentive to spend on care. Howe-
ver, Shavell argues that the costs of following the regulatory standard
are not the same for all injurers. Following the standard might be ineffi-
cient for some injurers. The injurers for whom following the regulatory
standard would only be possible at high costs should not be held to
follow this standard since it would create inefficiencies (see Shavell,
1994, 365-366; Faure and Van den Bergh, 1987, 109-100). The ques-
tion is whether this means that these injurers should not be held liable
if they violate the regulatory standard.
This problem can be compared with the bonus pater familias stan-
dard used in tort law. Although a detailed individualisation of stan-
dards of efficient care would be the optimal solution in a first best
world this is often impossible given the costs of an individualised stan-
dard setting. Therefore, the legal system sets the required level of care
at an average level, the so-called bonus pater familias standard. The
same can be said for regulation. If various groups can be identified at
low costs a separate standard for a certain group is efficient as long as
the gains from selecting a further group outweigh the further adminis-
trative costs. In most cases, however, the regulator will not have the
possibility of identifying atypical parties that might be able to avoid a
loss at lower costs, for instance because they pose lower risks than nor-
mal. Therefore, a single regulatory standard will be used (see Posner,
1998, 183-184; Shavell, 1987, 74).
Although one could, therefore, argue that a failure to satisfy the
regulatory requirement should not necessarily result in a finding of
negligence, so as to avoid some parties who pose lower risks taking
wasteful precautions (see Shavell, 1984, 365-366), most legal systems
generally consider a breach of a regulatory duty a fault. One of the
reasons for introducing safety regulation to prevent environmental da-
mage is, as was mentioned above, that the regulator will usually pos-
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sess better information to evaluate the efficient standard of care than
the parties involved. Hence, the regulation passes on information to
the parties on the efficient standard of care. The regulation also gives
information to the judge who has to evaluate the behaviour of the in-
jurer ex post in a liability case. The judge might lack the information
necessary to find out whether in a particular case an injurer should
not be held to follow the regulatory standard, for example because he
posed a lower risk than usual. Therefore, particularly in environmental
cases a judge will accept a finding of negligence as soon as a regula-
tory standard has been breached8. Thus, the statutory standards can
be applied to define negligence (see Rose-Ackerman, 1992a, 127).
3.3 Compliance with regulation and liability
Whereas according to tort law in many legal systems a breach of a
regulatory standard results automatically in a finding of negligence, the
opposite is not true : following a regulatory standard does not exclude a
finding of liability. In environmental law this is particularly important,
since the conditions under which an emission of pollutants is allowed
are mostly laid down in a permit. The industry often argues that as long
as they follow the conditions of the licence, no finding of negligence in
tort law is possible.
This point of view is, however, firmly rejected in most legal sys-
tems, for instance in both Belgium and in the Netherlands9. The basic
idea is that the administrative authority, when granting a licence and
setting permit conditions, cannot take into account the possible harm
that the licensed activity might cause to all possible third parties. Their
rights on compensation for damages may not be impaired simply be-
cause the operator of a plant followed the conditions of a licence. Legal
doctrine and case law clearly state that keeping the permit conditions
is just a minimum; in addition, the plant owner has to take all possible
precautions as deemed necessary under tort law to avoid his licensed
activity causing harm to third parties.
For instance in Dutch case law it is indeed generally accepted that
following the conditions of a licence does not release a plant owner from
potential liability 10. An exception would only exist if the interests of the
potential victims were clearly taken into account when the conditions
8 Faure and Van den Bergh have also argued that an advantage of this system is that it gives
victims incentives to prove that the regulatory standard has been breached. This makes the
victim an enforcer of safety regulation. He can claim compensation under the negligence rule
as soon as a causal relationship between the violation of the regulatory standard and his
damage is established. See Faure and Van den Bergh, 1987, 110-111.
9 For a comparative analysis of the question whether following a permit excludes criminal
liability see, Faure and Oudijk, 1994, 86-91.
10 See Supreme Court (Hoge Raad) 30 January 1914, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 1914, 497;
Supreme Court 10 March 1972, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie, 1972, 278.
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of the permit were set (see Rus-van der Veld, 1987, 111; Nieuwenhuis,
1991, 44-47). This point is made very clear in a famous case in the
Dutch Supreme Court that dealt with pollution caused by the French
salt mines in the Alsace region11. The Salt Mines argued that the emis-
sions were within the limits set by their permit and, therefore, not
illegal. The court, however, judged that the licence had not taken into
account the potential harmful effects of the emissions for third parties
and could, therefore, not release the salt mines from liability.
One can find a clear economic rationale for this rule. If compliance
with a regulatory standard or licence would automatically result in a
release from liability, the potential injurer would have no incentive to
invest more in care than the regulation asks from him, even if additio-
nal care could still reduce the expected accident costs beneficially (see
Shavell, 1984, 365; Faure and Van den Bergh, 1987, 110). A first rea-
son to hold an injurer liable (if the other conditions for liability are met),
although he has followed the regulatory standard, is that this standard
is often merely a minimum. Exposure to liability will give the potential
injurer incentives to take all efficient precautions, even if this requires
more than just following the licence. A second reason is that exposure
to liability might be a good remedy for the unavoidable capturing and
public choice effects that play a role when permits are granted. If a
permit would always release from liability, all a plant operator would
have to do, is get a good permit with easy conditions from a friendly
civil servant. That would then exclude any law suit for damages from
a potential victim. Finally, tort law can also be seen as a ‘stopgap’ for
situations not dealt with by the statute (see Rose-Ackerman, 1992a,
123). This makes clear that the exposure to liability notwithstanding
the permit is an important guarantee that the plant operator will take
efficient care.
Therefore, following the conditions of a license or – more generally
– regulatory standards, should not have a justificative effect in tort. The
opposite may only be true if it were clear that the administrative agency
took into account all potential harm of all interested third parties when
setting permit conditions. In such case a judge in an civil liability suit
should not be “second guessing” efficient agency decisions. It is, howe-
ver, rare that agencies will be able to take ex ante all these interests and
possible damages into account when setting permit conditions. Hence,
as a general rule, following licenses or regulatory standards should not
free from liability; the opposite would be the exception. This is the case
both under a negligence as well as under a strict liability rule. Indeed,
holding an injurer liable, notwithstanding he followed regulatory stan-
dards will play an important role under a strict liability rule, since this
will lead the injurer to take efficient care and adopt an efficient activity
level, i.e. to take all efficient measures to reduce the potential accident
11 Supreme Court 23 September 1988, Rechtspraak van de Week, 1988, 150 and see Faure, 1991,
128-129.
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costs, although this might require more to be done than the regulation
requires. Under a negligence rule this case law is also significant if the
efficient care standard (which is assumed to be equal to the due care
standard required by the legal system) is higher than the regulatory
standard.
4 Environmental liability
Let us finally examine how exactly environmental liability could be used
as a tool to prevent environmental harm.
4.1 Negligence versus strict liability : economic principles
One possible liability rule which will give the polluter an incentive to
spend on care to reach the optimal standard is the negligence rule.
This follows from the general literature on the economics of accident
law (see Shavell, 1987, 8 and Calabresi, 1975, 658). Assuming that
under a negligence rule the potential polluter will only have to pay
compensation if he spends less on care than the legal system wants him
to (due care) the firm will have an incentive to spend on care, since it
is a way to avoid liability which will maximise his utility. Provided that
the legal system defines the due care level as the optimal standard
a negligence rule will therefore give the polluter incentives to follow
the optimal standard. Also a strict liability rule will lead to optimal
incentives for care taking for the polluter, since taking efficient care will
minimise the expected accident costs which the potential polluter has
to bear under a strict liability system (see Polinsky, 1983, 39; Shavell,
1980, 11 and 1987, 8). Therefore, the literature generally accepts that
both a negligence rule and a strict liability rule will provide a potential
polluter with incentives to take the efficient care level. However, this
is only valid in a unilateral accident setting, i.e. an accident whereby
only the injurer can influence the accident risk. If victims were also
to be given incentives for accident reduction a contributory negligence
defence should be added to the strict liability rule. Under negligence
victims will always have an incentive to take efficient care as well since
they will in principle not be compensated by the injurer who, under a
negligence rule, will take efficient care to avoid liability.
However, the accident risk is not only influenced by the level of
care, but also by the number of times that the parties are involved in
the risky activity, i.e. the activity level. Hence, an optimal liability rule
should also give the parties in a potential accident setting incentives
to adopt an optimal activity level. A negligence rule will not give op-
timal incentives to the injurer to adopt an optimal activity level since
the activity level is not incorporated in the due care standard which
138 Économie publique 2001 / 1
Economic Analysis of environmental Law : An Introduction
the court applies (see Adams, 1989; Diamond, 1974; Shavell, 1980).
Hence, under a negligence rule the injurer only has an incentive to
take efficient care (to escape liability) but not to adopt an efficient ac-
tivity level. Under a strict liability rule, on the contrary, an injurer has
an incentive to adopt an efficient activity level since this is also a way
to minimise the total expected accident costs which he has to bear.
Moreover, under negligence the injurer will only take the due care, the
legal system requires from him, but he has no incentive to take other
precautionary measures which could reduce the risk of environmental
damage. Strict liability has the advantage, that it gives incentives to
the injurer to take all efficient precautionary measures to reduce the
risk, also those which could not be incorporated into the due care le-
vel under negligence. In a unilateral accident model (whereby only the
behaviour of the injurer influences the accident risk) strict liability is
therefore the efficient liability rule since it leads both to efficient care
and to an optimal activity level.
4.2 Legal justifications for strict liability
The reason that is often advanced in legal literature in favour of strict
(environmental) liability is that strict liability will help the victim in
obtaining compensation since he is released from the heavy burden
of proving fault under the negligence rule. However, from a deterrency
point of view victim compensation is not as such a goal of accident law.
The duty of the injurer to compensate his victim is only an instrument
to reach deterrence efficiency. Moreover, the victim compensation ar-
gument to introduce strict liability for environmental pollution is not
that convincing in all cases. Indeed, many legal systems qualify every
violation of a statutory or regulatory norm as a civil fault12. Most in-
dustries are subjected to extensive safety regulation. Hence, in these
systems the victim only has to prove the violation of one of these re-
gulations to establish a fault13. If, in addition, the victim can prove
a causal relationship with the loss suffered, he will be able to claim
compensation. In many accident cases this burden of proof will the-
refore not be as heavy as has been argued. It is, therefore, at least
questionable whether a strict liability rule substantially improves the
situation of the victim in comparison with an already existing broadly
interpreted civil fault regime. It should also not be overlooked that un-
der the general fault regime of tort law no limitations apply and the
victim is entitled to full compensation. In many of the environmental
cases where strict liability was first introduced, more particularly in the
international conventions concerning nuclear accidents and oil pollu-
12 See for Dutch case law e.g. the so called Jumbo II case of 1 October 1993, Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie, 1995, 182.
13 The economic rationale for this rule was discussed above.
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tion14, financial caps and other limitations on the victim’s rights were
introduced. The alleged compensating benefit of the strict liability in
those cases is therefore doubtful.
4.3 Strict liability for environmental damage ?
Although the classic victim compensation argument may as such not
justify the introduction of strict liability for environmental pollution,
there are on the other hand economic reasons based on deterrence
efficiency for introducing a strict liability rule. Environmental pollution
can in most cases certainly be considered a unilateral accident, i.e. an
accident whereby only the injurer can influence the accident risk. In
this case we noted that the economic model predicts that the advantage
of the strict liability rule is that it will give the injurer an incentive both
to adopt an optimal activity level and to take efficient care. Since the
victim cannot influence the accident risk, strict liability seems to be
the first best solution to give the potential polluter optimal incentives
for accident reduction in those cases (see Faure, 1995).
In sum, if we apply the criteria of Shavell determining the choice
between negligence and strict liability to the environmental case, there
seem to be strong arguments in favour of an introduction of strict lia-
bility. In many cases environmental pollution will be truly unilateral
in the sense that only the injurer’s activity can influence the accident
risk, which constitutes a strong case for strict liability15. In other cases
the victim will certainly be able to exercise an influence on the risk as
well. One can more specifically think about situations where the vic-
tim has the possibility to mitigate damages after the accident occurred.
However, in those cases it is not the victim’s activity level, but his level
of care which influences the accident risk. This can be controlled by
adding a contributory or comparative negligence defence to the strict
liability rule.
4.4 A few refinements
Many scholars argued that there is indeed a strong case in favour of
strict liability for environmental damage : this will give the potential pol-
luter optimal incentives for accident reduction and hence, for optimal
internalisation (see Endres and Staiger, 1996). There is, however, ano-
ther important aspect of the difference between negligence and strict
14 See with respect to nuclear accidents OECD, 1994; Faure and Skogh, 1992, 499-513; Depri-
moz, 1995, 1-24 and with respect to civil liability for marine oil pollution Faure and Heine,
1991, 39-54 and for recent evolutions Brans, 1994, 61-67 and 85-91.
15 In some cases it will be the victim’s activity that caused the harm, e.g. if the victim knowingly
came to the nuisance. This may then lead to a denial of a claim on compensation. See in that
respect the discussion on the coming to the nuisance doctrine, by Wittman, 1980, 557-568.
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liability which should be mentioned. This concerns the fact that the ap-
plication of negligence requires high information costs from the judge,
who will have to set the due care standard. The information necessary
to weigh costs and benefits and fix the optimal care may not be readily
available for the judge. Strict liability shifts all costs to the injurer, who
will then have to define the optimal care level. If one therefore assumes
that, as may be the case with environmental harm, the information
on optimal precaution is better available with industry than with the
judges, this constitutes an argument for strict liability. This informa-
tion advantage may therefore constitute an additional argument in fa-
vour of strict liability for environmental harm. One should, however,
remember that this finding only holds in all the models, such as the
one which is e.g. developed by Shavell, which start from an assumption
of risk neutrality. If risk aversion is introduced and the potential inju-
rer is risk averse, Endres/Schwarze correctly argue that strict liability
is only efficient if in some way risk can be removed from the risk averse
injurer, e.g. through insurance (see Endres and Schwarze, 1991).
There are other reasons why the seemingly advantage of strict lia-
bility should be somewhat balanced. First of all, it was assumed until
now that the injurer has money at stake to pay compensation to the
victim. If, however, the amount of the damage exceeds the injurer’s
wealth, a problem of underdeterrence will arise. Under strict liability
the injurer will consider the accident as one which is equal to his to-
tal wealth and will therefore only take the care necessary to avoid an
accident with a magnitude equal to his total wealth. If that wealth is
lower than the magnitude of an accident he will take less than the op-
timal care and therefore a problem of underdeterrence arises under
strict liability. Insolvency is less of a problem under negligence since
under that rule the injurer will still have an incentive to take the care
required by the legal system as long as the costs of taking care are less
than his individual wealth. Taking due care remains indeed a way for
the injurer to avoid to have to pay compensation to the victim. If there
would thus be a potential accident setting whereby the magnitude of
the loss may be higher than the injurer’s wealth (which can often be the
case in environmental liability) this constitutes an argument in favor
of negligence rather than strict liability.
4.5 White paper on environmental liability
As we already indicated, in many international conventions, a strict
liability regime is introduced for environmental harm. This is equally
the case in many legal systems. Recently the European Commission
introduced a white paper on environmental liability (see COM (2000)
66 final of 9 Februari 2000). In that white paper the Commission took a
rather balanced approach towards the choice between negligence and
strict liability. The Commission opts for a strict liability rule for all
2001 / 1 Économie publique 141
Michael G. Faure
harm which originates from hazardous activities. For all the damage
originating from other activities the Commission proposes a negligence
rule.
This original approach of the European Commission is very much
in line with the predictions of the economic model as presented above.
Hazardous activities can often be considered unilateral and in those
situations it is important to control the injurer’s activity through a strict
liability rule. The same is, however, not true in case of non-hazardous
activities which may cause environmental harm. The dividing line (non-
hazardous/hazardous) chosen by the European Commission, seems
therefore to follow economic logic.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper I tried, without using formal models or equations, to prove
the importance of traditional concepts of law and economics for en-
vironmental lawyers and policy makers. By focusing on various as-
pects of environmental law (more specifically liability, regulation and
the combination of the two) the practical use of the economic analy-
sis of law was demonstrated. Law and economics may thus contribute
towards a better understanding of environmental law, e.g. by provi-
ding an understanding of why environmental law is so often subjec-
ted to regulation. In addition, the paper showed that traditional law
and economics can also contribute to environmental economics. Law
and economics e.g. points at the deterrent effect of liability rules, a
point which is often neglected in traditional writings on environmental
economics. Moreover, law and economics stresses the importance of a
combined use of various instruments to control environmental pollu-
tion by pointing at strength and weaknesses of each legal instrument,
taken separately.
A rather reassuring conclusion for environmental lawyers is that
current environmental law in many Western European legal systems
seems to correspond to a large extent to economic logic. However, the
fact that environmental law is e.g. relying heavily on regulation may
correspond with Shavell’s criteria for safety regulation, it does on the
other hand not imply that every specific type of environmental regu-
lation is always efficient. Indeed, there may be various reasons why
regulatory outcomes may fail to be effective. One reason may be poor
information by the regulator; another one concerns the risk that the
regulator is captured by special interests. For these and many other
reasons, some of the traditional (command and control) regulation in
environmental law has often been considered inefficient by economists.
Moreover, the analysis presented in this paper could only provide
a basic introduction to the economics of environmental law. There are,
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however, various caveats which have to be considered :
This paper mainly adressed the question what instruments
should be used to prevent environmental harm. It did, however, not
concern the question to what level environmental pollution should be
internalized. Obviously environmental harm should, from an econo-
mic point of view, not be prevented at all costs, but should imply some
weighing of costs and benefits.
Second, I only focused on two specific, be it important, policy
instruments to control environmental harm, regulation and liability.
Many other instruments which become increasingly important today,
such as taxes and more particularly market oriented instruments such
as marketable permits have not been discussed. Future environmental
law and economics research will focus on the possible combined use
of various of those instruments.
Third, in this paper it was assumed that external force (e.g. the
threat of being held liable) is necessary to give a potential polluter
incentives to prevent environmental harm. However, there may be a
number of reasons why companies would engage voluntarily in invest-
ments in environmentally friendly technology. In some cases a change
to cleaner production technologies may lead both to reduction of en-
vironmental harm and to a better economic performance of the firm
concerned. In addition, a firm may find it advantagous to present itself
as “green” as a marketing tool. Thus it could e.g. submit itself volunta-
rily to eco-audits. Thus there may be many (economic) reasons for the
voluntary implementation of technologies which lead to environmen-
tal improvements, without the necessity to have a legal rule coercing
towards environmental improvement.
Finally it is important to remember that economics, how undoub-
tedly useful it can be, provides only “one view of the cathedral” (com-
pare Calabresi and Melamed, 1972) by analysing legal rules on the
basis of the efficiency criterion. Environmental lawyers and policy ma-
kers may, however, sometimes have other goals they want to achieve
(at least on paper) than economic efficiency. But even if policy makers
would e.g. define the goal of environmental policy as being something
like “environmental justice”, than economic analysis remains a useful
tool. It can indeed explain to policy makers how to obtain the maximum
“environmental justice” per dollar spend16.
16 Compare Easterbrook, 1983, 289-332 who argues the same with respect to those who would
reject a deterrence-based approach to criminal law.
2001 / 1 Économie publique 143
Michael G. Faure
References
Adams, M., 1989, “New Activities and the Efficient Liability Rules”, in
M. Faure. and R. Van den Bergh (eds), Essays in Law and Eco-
nomics. Corporations, Accident Prevention and Compensation for
Losses, Maklu.
Bocken, H., 1987 and 1988, “Alternatives to Liability and liability in-
surance for the compensation of pollution damages”, Tijdschrift
voor Milieuaansprakelijkheid, 4-87, pp. 83-87 and Tijdschrift voor
Milieuaansprakelijkheid, 1-88, pp. 3-10.
Brans, E. H. P., 1994, “Liability for Ecological Damage under the 1992
Protocols to the Civil Liability Convention and the Fund Conven-
tion and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990”, Tijdschrift voor Milieuaans-
prakelijkheid, pp. 61-67 and pp. 85-91.
Calabresi, G. and Melamed, D., 1972, “Property rules, liability rules
and inalienability : one view of the cathedral”, Harvard Law Re-
view, 85, pp. 1089-1128.
Calabresi, G., 1975, “Optimal Deterrence and Accidents”, Yale Law
Journal, 84, pp. 656-671..
Coase, R.H., 1960, “The Problem of Social Cost”, Journal of Law and
Economics, 1 (1), pp. 1-44.
Deprimoz, J., 1995, “Regime Juridique des Assurances contre les Ris-
ques Nucléaires”, Juris. Classeur, 555, pp. 1-24.
Dewees, D, Duff, D. and M. Trebilcock, 1996, Exploring the Domain
of Accident Law. Taking the Facts Seriously, New York, Oxford,
Oxford University Press.
Dewees, D., 1992, “The Comparative Efficacy of Tort Law and Regu-
lation for Environmental Protection”, Geneva Papers on Risk and
Insurance, pp. 446-467.
Dewees, D., 1992, “Tort Law and the Deterrence of Environmental Pol-
lution” in Tietenberg, T.H., (ed.), Innovation in Environmental Po-
licy, Economic and Legal Aspects of Recent Developments in En-
vironmental Enforcement of Liability, Brookfield, Elgon, pp. 139-
164.
Diamond, P., 1974, “Single Activity Accidents”, Journal of Legal Studies,
pp. 107-164.
Easterbrook, F., 1983, “Criminal procedure as a market system”, Jour-
nal of Legal Studies, pp. 289-332.
Endres, A. and B. Staiger, 1996. “Ökonomische Aspekte des Umwelt-
haftungsrecht”, in M. Ahrens and J. Simon, (eds.), Umwelthafung,
Risikosteuerung und Versicherung, Berlin, Ehrich Schmidt Verlag,
pp. 79-93.
Endres, A. and R. Schwarze, 1991, “Allokationswirkungen einer Um-
welthaftpflicht-versicherung”, Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik und
Umweltrecht, pp. 1-25.
144 Économie publique 2001 / 1
Economic Analysis of environmental Law : An Introduction
Faure, M. and G. Skogh, 1992, “Compensation for Damages Caused
by Nuclear Accidents : A Convention as Insurance”, The Geneva
Papers on Risk and Insurance, pp. 499-513.
Faure, M. and G. Heine, ”The Insurance of Fines : The Case of Oil Pollu-
tion”, The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance, 1991, pp. 39-54.
Faure, M. and J.-C. Oudijk, 1994, “Die strafgerichtliche Überprüfung
von Verwaltungsakten im Umweltrecht. Ein rechtsvergleichender
Überblick der Systeme in Deutschland, den Niederlanden und
Belgien”, Juristenzeitung, pp. 86-91.
Faure, M. and M. Ruegg, 1994, “Standard Setting through General
Principles of Environmental Law”, in M. Faure, J. Vervaele and A.
Weale. (eds.), Environmental Standards in the European Union in
an Interdisciplinary Framework, Antwerp, Maklu, pp. 39-60.
Faure, M., 1991. “De gevolgen van de ’administratieve afhankelijkheid’
van het milieustrafrecht : een inventarisatie van knelpunten” in
M. Faure, J. Oudijk and D. Schaffmeister (eds.), Zorgen van He-
den, Arnhem, Gouda-Quint, pp. 128-129.
Faure, M., 1995, “Economic Models of Compensation for Damage Cau-
sed by Nuclear Accidents : Some Lessons for the Revision of the
Paris and Vienna Conventions”, European Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, pp. 21-43.
Faure, M., 1996, “Economic aspects of environmental liability : an in-
troduction”, European Review of Private Law, pp. 85-109.
Gunningham, N. and P. Grabosky, 1998, Smart Regulation. Designing
Environmental Policy, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
Kolstad, Ch.D., T. S. Ulen and G. V. Johnson, 1990, “Ex Post Liability
for Harm vs. Ex Ante Safety Regulation : Substitutes or Compli-
ments ?”, American Economic Review, 80, pp. 888-901.
Landes, W. and R. Posner, 1984, “Tort law as a regulatory regime for
catastrophic personal injuries”, Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 417-
434.
MacKay, E., 1982, Economics of information and the law, Boston, Klu-
wer.
Nieuwenhuis, J.H., 1991, “Blinddoek en balans in het milieurecht. Drie
manieren om belangen af te wegen” in A. M. Hol and M. A. Loth
(eds.), Dilemma’s van aansprakelijkheid, pp. 44-47.
OECD, 1994, Liability and Compensation for Nuclear Damage, An Inter-
national Overview, Paris, OECD.
Polinsky, A.M., 1983, Introduction to Law and Economics, Boston, Little,
Brown & Co.
Posner, R., 1998, Economic Analysis of Law, 5th Edition, New York,
Aspen.
Rose-Ackerman, S., 1991, “Regulation and the Law of Torts”, American
Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, May, pp. 54-58.
2001 / 1 Économie publique 145
Michael G. Faure
Rose-Ackerman, S., 1992 a, Re-thinking the Progressive Agenda, the Re-
form of the American Regulatory State, New York, The Free Press.
Rose-Ackerman, S., 1992 b, “Environmental Liability Law”, in T. H. Tie-
tenberg (ed.), Innovation in Environmental Policy, Economic and Le-
gal Aspects of Recent Developments in Environmental Enforcement
and Liability, Brookfield, Edward Elgar, pp. 223-243.
Rose-Ackerman, S., 1995, “Public Law versus Private Law in Environ-
mental Regulation : European Union Proposals in the Light of Uni-
ted States Experience”, Review of European Community and Inter-
national Environmental Law, RECIEL, 4, pp. 312-32.
Rose-Ackerman, S., 1995, Controlling Environmental Policy : the Limits
of Public Law in Germany and the United States, New Haven and
London, Yale University Press.
Rose-Ackerman, S., 1996, “Public Law versus Private Law in Environ-
mental Regulation : European Union Proposals in the Light of Uni-
ted States and German Experiences”, in Eide, E. and Van den
Bergh, R. (eds.), Law and Economics of the Environment, Oslo,
Juridisk Forlag, pp. 13-39.
Rus-van der Veld, M., 1987, “Onrechtmatige daad en vergunning”, in
N.S.J. Koeman, W. J. Ouwerkerk and J. M. Van Dunné (Eds.),
Civielrechtelijke aansprakelijkheid voor milieuschade, Vereniging
voor Milieurecht, 4, Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, pp. 105-113.
Schwartz, A. and L. Wilde, 1979, “Intervening in markets on the basis of
imperfect information : a legal and economic analysis”, University
of Pennsylvania Law Review, pp. 630-682.
Shavell, S., 1980, “Strict Liability versus Negligence”, Journal of Legal
Studies, pp. 1-25.
Shavell, S., 1984 a, “A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety
Regulation”, Rand Journal of Economics, pp. 271-280.
Shavell, S., 1984 b, “Liability for Harm versus Regulation of Safety”,
Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 357-374.
Shavell, S., 1985, “Criminal law and the optimal use of non-monetary
sanctions as a deterrent”, Columbia Law Review, pp. 1232-1262.
Shavell, S., 1986, “The judgement proof problem”, International Review
of Law and Economics, pp. 43-58.
Shavell, S., 1987. Economic Analysis of Accident Law, Cambridge, Har-
vard University Press.
Stigler, G., 1961, “The economics of information”, Journal of Political
Economy.
Van den Bergh, R., 1988, “Le droit civil façe à l’analyse économique du
droit”, Revue Internationale de Droit Economique.
Wittman, D., 1980, “First come, first served : an economic analysis of
coming to nuisance”’, Journal of Legal Studies, pp. 557-568.
146 Économie publique 2001 / 1
Economic Analysis of environmental Law : An Introduction
Résumé
Cet article montre comment différents d’instruments juridiques peu-
vent être utilisée pour traiter les problèmes de pollution environne-
mentale. On démontre pourquoi les règles de responsabilité ne peu-
vent suffire pour contrôler les risques environnementaux. Le recours
à la réglementation ne peut non plus suffire. Il faut donc mélanger
des règles de responsabilité et la réglementation. Comment ? Telle est
la question que résoud cet article. Une autre question est également
abordée : quel est le type de responsabillité optimal afin d’internaliser
les risques environnementaux.
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to show how a variety of traditional le-
gal instruments can be used to remedy environmental pollution. Using
the traditional public interest criteria for regulation, it is explained why
liability rules alone can not suffice to control the risks posed by envi-
ronmental harm. However, the conclusion that in environmental law
some regulatory invention will be necessary does not exclude the role
of environmental liability. Hence the question arises how liability rules
and regulation can be used jointly to remedy environmental pollution
and how they mutually influence each other. Finally, the question will
have to be asked which of these liability rules is optimal to internalize
environmental risks.
Mots clé
Environnement, responsabilité civile, réglementation, responsabilité
sans faute
Key words
Liability, regulation, strict liability, environmental liability
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